AFGE Statement for OMB Hearing
Wednesday July 22, 2009
INTRODUCTION
The American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO (AFGE), which represents more than 600,000 federal employees throughout the United States and overseas, welcomes the opportunity to provide comments to the Obama administration and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) about the President’s efforts to establish a framework for improving the federal acquisition system and managing the federal workforce.
AFGE supported the election of President Obama and was pleased that he came to the White House pledging to restore the American people’s faith in the public sector and curb the drive to privatize government services. Our support for the President was reinforced in March 2009 when he announced significant reforms in government contracting, including a call for all inherently governmental work to be returned to federal employees. AFGE has long insisted that such tasks should always be performed by reliable and experienced federal employees who put the public interest first.
The Department of the Army has shown extraordinary leadership in insourcing functions that were inappropriately outsourced, determining which functions are inherently governmental, and taking stock of the contractor workforce, and we encourage the rest of the federal government to follow suit.
Our members understand that cleaning up the federal contracting problems left behind by the Bush administration will take a significant amount of work. That’s why AFGE is pushing on a number of fronts to reform the contracting system and begin the process of returning certain functions to the federal government. Below are our specific comments to the questions presented by OMB.
TABLE of COMMENTS
- Apolitical Procurement (response to Area 4(d)).
- OMB Circular A-76 (response to Area 4(c)).
- Inherently Governmental Services (response to Area 4(a), (b), (c), and (e)).
- Direct Conversions (response to Area 4(c)).
- Insourcing (response to Area 4(b)).
[Area 4(d): How do federal contracting policies affect practices in the private sector labor market?]
The time has come when action can finally be taken to improve the lives of federal contractor employees. However, it is imperative in doing so that we don’t politicize the procurement process. Significant or repeat violators of workplace, tax, and environmental laws should not receive federal contracts, and contractors generally should be expected to adhere to clear standards for pay, health care, and retirement benefits for federal contractor employees.
If federal contractors generally are required to meet clear standards for their employees’ pay and compensation, there is no need to put `a thumb on the scale’ with preferences and set-asides in order to steer contracts to contractors who have better labor records but who are also more expensive.
It may be tempting to use preferences for small businesses as a precedent for giving a new preference to federal contractors with better labor records. However, such an explicitly political preference, although well-intentioned, would be the first of its kind. All previous preferences have been for small businesses, the blind and the handicapped, and Federal Prison Industries.
Preferences based on a contractor’s labor record would open up the procurement process to additional political preferences which would undermine the integrity of the procurement process and most likely the interests of both federal employees and contractor employees.
The firms most likely to qualify for special political preferences would be large contractors. Consequently, the special political preference would require taxpayers to pay more than they otherwise would to firms that would bear no resemblance to the small and disadvantaged businesses that benefitted from earlier preferences. And that would clearly be contrary to President Obama’s March 4, 2009, Government Contracting memorandum.
Earlier preferences have resulted in significant and systematic waste, fraud, and abuse. Indeed, contractors with preferences regularly pass on work to ineligible contractors, both legally and illegally. Enforcement of illegal subcontracts is rare. In fact, preferences can be used to steer work towards certain contractors. Some contractors might even establish small subsidiaries just to qualify for special political preferences and thus win large contracts, but then pass on the work to ineligible entities. Because this special political preference would benefit large contractors, rather than small businesses, the harm to taxpayers would surely be far worse.
AFGE believes that, as the effort to reconstruct the federal government’s executive branch civil service begins again, we must not implement reforms - no matter how well-intentioned - that would lead to inefficient and unfair decisions to contract out federal employees. If the special political preferences were used in public-private competitions or direct conversions, i.e., giving work performed by federal employees to contractors without public-private competition, federal employees would be at a distinct disadvantage. No matter how much more efficient, federal employees could still lose because the purpose of the special political preference is to give work to more expensive contractors.
Moreover, if a pitched legislative battle is necessary to enact a special political preference, it would clearly be better for working Americans if that fight was instead about requiring contractors generally to adhere to clear standards for pay, health care, and retirement benefits. That battle could benefit all federal contractor employees instead of the small minority who work for contractors with better labor records.
Our proposal would not politicize the procurement process or undermine its integrity; nor would it result in inefficient or unfair decisions to contract out work performed by federal employees. Instead, our proposal would be a win-win-win for federal employees, contractor employees and taxpayers, and result in a more honest and apolitical procurement process.
We are still cleaning up the mess left behind by the previous Administration which completely politicized the procurement process, using it as a tool to reward friends, thus becoming ensnared in scandal after scandal. Even with noble intentions, it is imperative that we don’t repeat those mistakes by trying to use the procurement process to reward another set of friends.
[Area 4(c) What criteria should agencies use in deciding whether a government activity should be competed?]
Impose an A-76 Moratorium
AFGE is asking the Obama administration to suspend the use of the A-76 process until much-needed reforms have been implemented and cancel ongoing A-76 studies.
A 2006 DoD Inspector General report and two 2008 Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports detail how poor guidance from the Bush Administration OMB on the A-76 process resulted in systematically overstated savings and understated costs as well as a disproportionately adverse impact on older, female, and African-American civil servants.
- DoD Inspector General (IG) D-2006-028
“DoD had not effectively implemented a system to track and assess the cost of the performance of functions under the competitive sourcing program…The overall costs and the estimated savings of the competitive sourcing program may be either overstated or understated. In addition, legislators and Government officials were not receiving reliable information to determine the costs and benefits of the competitive sourcing program and whether it is achieving the desired objectives and outcomes…DoD had not implemented a comprehensive system to track and assess the quality of contractor and MEO (in-house) performance under the competitive sourcing program…Accordingly, Congress and Government officials do not have an effective management tool to assess the quality of either contractor or MEO performance under the competitive sourcing program.”
- Government Accountability Office (GAO-08-195)
“(W)ithout clear guidance, and in light of its plans to examine the activities of two thirds of its workforce, we believe that the (Forest Service) is at risk of subjecting inherently governmental and core-commercial activities to future competitive sourcing competitions…
“For fiscal years 2004 through 2006, we found that the Forest Service lacked sufficiently complete and reliable cost data to…accurately report competitive sourcing savings to Congress…(W)e found that the Forest Service did not consider certain substantial costs in its savings calculations, and thus Congress may not have an accurate measure of the savings produced by the Forest Service’s competitive sourcing competitions. Although OMB provides guidance on how to calculate the savings, the guidance does not specify all of the costs that should be included in the calculations, thus providing the Forest Service with some discretion on which costs to include.
“Some of the costs the Forest Service did not include in the calculations substantially reduce or even exceed the savings reported to Congress. For example, regarding the IT infrastructure competition, the Forest Service did not include the $40 million that it cost to make the transition to the MEO. This amount is $5 million more than the $35 million in savings that the agency reported to Congress.
- Government Accountability Office (GAO-09-14)
“[The Department of Labor’s (DoL)] savings reports, while adhering to OMB reporting guidance, exclude many of the costs associated with competitive sourcing and are unreliable. In reporting its estimated $15.7 million in savings due to competitive sourcing from fiscal years 2004 through 2007, DOL excluded a number of substantial items, including the time in-house staff spent on competition activities, precompetition planning, certain transition costs, and postcompetition review activities.
“OMB does not require agencies to report these costs because they reflect what would be incurred as part of an agency’s typical management responsibilities. However, our analysis shows that these costs can be substantial and that excluding them overstates savings achieved by competitive sourcing. For example, we found that including in-house staff time spent on competition activities would have doubled the costs reported for one competition.
“In addition, DoL competition savings reports are unreliable and do not provide an accurate measure of competitive sourcing savings. All three of the competitions that we randomly selected and analyzed had inaccuracies. For example, DoL excluded contract administration costs from one competition’s savings figure, overstating savings by about $185,000 a year, or 25 percent. In addition to these inaccuracies, DoL used projections to estimate savings for seven of its competitions when actual numbers should have been used, sometimes resulting in overstated savings. In one competition, actual staffing costs were 45 percent higher than those originally projected. Finally, the cost baseline used by DoL to estimate savings was inaccurate and misrepresented savings in some cases, such as when preexisting, budgeted personnel vacancies increased the savings attributed to completed competitions...
“We have previously reported that other federal agencies—the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Forest Service, in particular—did not develop comprehensive estimates for the costs associated with competitive sourcing. This report identifies similar issues at DoL.
“Without a better system to assess performance and comprehensively track all the costs associated with competitive sourcing, DoL cannot reliably assess whether competitive sourcing truly provides the best deal for the taxpayer.”
Reforming the A-76 Process
AFGE urges the Obama Administration to work with representatives of federal employees to reform the A-76 circular to make the process more accountable to taxpayers and more fair to federal employees. Below are several of the reforms proposed by AFGE:
- Conversion Differential. Increase the conversion differential to finally take into account the often significant costs of conducting A-76 studies, including preliminary planning costs, consultants costs, costs of federal employees diverted from their actual jobs to work on privatization studies, transition costs, post-competition review costs, and proportional costs for agencies’ privatization bureaucracies (both in-house and out-house).
- Length of studies. Double the minimum cost differential for studies that last longer than 24 months—measured from the beginning of preliminary planning until the award decision.
- Overhead. Eliminate the arbitrary 12% overhead charge on in-house bids.
- Inherently Governmental. Adhere to the statutory definition of “inherently governmental”, pending a satisfactory redefinition.
- Vacancies. Prohibit the filling of vacant commercial federal employee positions with contractors as well as entering into a contract to provide the services that had been provided by those employees without first conducting an A-76 study.
- Transparency. Require agencies to make all information that is available to contractors as part of A-76 studies, including information on FedTeds, available to federal employees and their union and bid protest representatives.
- Support In-house Providers. Require agencies to provide winning in-house bidders (i.e,, Most Efficient Organizations) with all resources obligated by the awards.
- Health Care Costs. Correct implementation of the exclusion of health care costs from the contracting out cost comparison process to ensure that Congressional intent is realized.
- Recompetition. Prohibit recompetition of an in-house workforce when its performance period expires, absent a formal and public determination by the head of the agency prior to the end of that performance period that the in-house workforce failed to achieve a majority of the requirements established in the performance agreement.
- Waivers. Require that waivers to any of the rules governing the A-76 process should be available to the public (affected employees and their representatives should receive special notice) before the waivers are implemented.
- Enforcement. Establish a nonpolitical entity to enforce public-private competition laws and regulations, allowing a forum for affected employees to bring challenges to agency actions with the authority to require agency compliance before contracting can occur. OMB officials acknowledge that they have insufficient resources to enforce the A-76 Circular. In the FY2008 Defense Authorization Act and FY2008 Omnibus Appropriations Act, federal employees were given the right to bring a protest to the Government Accountability Office for agency failures to adhere to the public-private competition rules. Unfortunately, this forum has proven to be an inadequate solution to agency rule-breaking, with GAO declining to hear almost all protests filed by affected federal employees for procedural reasons.
- Notice and Comment. Require all government-wide public-private competition rules to be formally published, with a notice and comment period, rather than issued via memorandum.
- Agency Tender Resources. Require agencies to provide adequate resources to the in-house team competing in an A-76 study, including designated, full-time legal counsel with expertise in procurement and the public-private competition process.
- Training. Develop a standardized training and certification program required for all individuals substantially involved in any public-private competition or oversight thereof, including all officials named in the A-76 Circular, members of the Preliminary Work Statement team and the MEO team, advisers to the MEO team, and the source selection authority and/or board. This training program should be overseen and conducted by government personnel.
- Illegal Preference for Contractors. Remove language in the A-76 Circular that expresses a bias towards the use of contractors instead of government personnel.
Alternatives to the A-76 Process.
Agencies should be encouraged to use Business Process Reengineering (BPR) in lieu of OMB Circular A-76 privatization reviews to achieve improvements in the delivery of services. As noted earlier, even the Bush Administration, however belatedly, was moving in this direction. Given the success of federal employees in OMB Circular A-76 privatization reviews, agencies should avoid incurring the costs and controversies of A-76 studies. Here are some related recommendations AFGE offers:
- Document all internal reengineering efforts: Agencies reinvent themselves constantly, often for the better. However, these success stories are rarely reported. Agencies should documents all of their BPR efforts, both to show the American people that agencies are conscientious stewards of their tax dollars and to show other agencies how they might improve their services.
- Don’t sabotage the pro-change environment. Federal employees, after the last eight years, are yearning for opportunities to make their agencies more efficient. Consequently, internal reengineering efforts cannot be used by management as subterfuge to change the collective bargaining status of affected federal employees. Similarly, BPR should not be implemented with savings assumptions or downsizing formulae. A particular internal reengineering effort may result in a reduction in the size of the workforce. However, that determination must be made on the basis of the BPR in question, not as a result of a general assumption or formula.
- Labor-management partnerships should be established for developing and implementing internal reengineering efforts. The right of represented employees to negotiate over the impact and implementation of the changes wrought by BPR should be respected.
- AFGE wanted to work with the Army Corps of Engineers on some significant High Performing Organizations (HPOs). However, the Corps used on HPO to strip several hundred employees of their collective bargaining rights – without any plausible rationale – forcing AFGE and other affected unions to successfully petition the Congress to revoke the authority of the Corps to implement any other HPOs.
- INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS
Area 4: (a) Managing the multi-sector workforce – How might the current definition of inherently governmental function be clarified to improve management of the multi-sector workforce?
(b) What types of criteria might help agencies identify non-inherently governmental functions that are critical to an agency, with respect to its unique missions and structure, and need to be performed by federal employees in order for the agency to maintain control of its mission and operations?
(c) What criteria should agencies use in deciding whether a government activity should be competed?
(e) If there are laws, regulations, policies, or agency practices that a commentator believes have involved a misclassification of a function as inherently governmental or as commercial, please identify these and outline your concern in as much detail as possible, so that this can help to inform our review.
The federal government exists to serve the American public, and this obligation remains with the government, whether or not the government contracts with the private sector to perform particular functions. The government must keep for itself those functions necessary to carry out its missions and maintain control over all government actions in order to fulfill this obligation.
Due to federal hiring restrictions, increasing requirements, and the indiscriminate privatization of the Bush Administration, the federal government has contracted out to the private sector functions that are inherently governmental, closely related to inherently government functions, or mission-essential and should never have been performed by the private sector.
Bush Administration OMB officials inappropriately watered down the statutory definition of inherently governmental when they overhauled the A-76 Circular and pressured agencies to designate functions as commercial that managers considered inherently governmental or at least “inappropriate for contractor performance”. By imposing privatization quotas, Bush Administration OMB officials pressured agencies to review for privatization functions that managers often preferred to retain in-house. And by allowing agencies to contract out work without any consideration of in-house performance, more and more functions that are considered inherently governmental or otherwise inappropriate for contractor performance were ultimately turned over to contractors, many of whom have been either inadequately supervised or supervised by other contractors.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is an example of an agency that has critical and sensitive work performed by contractors. According to the GAO, DHS uses contractors to prepare budgets, develop policy, support acquisition, develop and interpret regulations, reorganize and plan, and administer A-76 efforts. In contracting out such work, agency officials don’t even bother to subject those contractors to extra surveillance, let alone look for opportunities to bring such work back in-house.
The Bush Administration’s drive to privatize was characterized by two faulty assumptions: (1) that the federal government should provide a preference to relying on the private sector for the performance of commercial functions and (2) that every function that the government needs performed is commercial unless proven otherwise. While these assumptions have been extremely beneficial to the finances of federal contractor executives, they have failed the American public and driven up the costs of government. The first assumption is also a violation of federal law (10 U.S.C. 129(a)) requiring the Department of Defense to use the most cost effective source to perform commercial services.
As President Obama stated in the March 4, 2009 memorandum on government contracting, the federal government has an overriding obligation to American taxpayers to perform its functions efficiently and effectively. To this end, the preference for using the private sector to perform any services (commercial or otherwise) should be abolished. In addition, all services needed by the government should be considered inherently governmental until otherwise determined by appropriate government officials.
Overriding Concerns
Previous efforts to define the term “inherently governmental” have focused on the characteristics of particular functions. While these definitions have been somewhat useful, there are other overriding concerns that should first be considered before turning to the character of the function.
Technical Expertise/Institutional Memory
Agencies must develop and retain the technical expertise and institutional memory needed to manage and provide all functions necessary to meet their missions. This expertise is not limited to that needed merely to oversee contractor performance but also to make decisions for the agency about those functions and to perform those functions if necessary. In addition, no function should be contracted to the private sector if to do so would endanger the future technical capacity and institutional memory of the agency.
In the private sector, the rush to outsource functions considered routine has left many companies without the in-house expertise to effectively communicate with the contractors hired to do these functions. Too much outsourcing leads an entity to lose sight of what it needs from a function and how those goals can be achieved. Many private companies, and state and local governments, have insourced work in recent years so that they own the expertise rather than relying on someone else to tell them both what they need and how much it will cost.
Federal agencies should undertake this same process. In the mad dash to hire contractors to perform tasks that, at first glance, seem to be commercial, agencies have been drained of in-house expertise in a multitude of functions. In-house technical expertise in all functions performed by an agency, in addition to contract management skills, is necessary to perform essential management functions. Most federal government contracting horror stories start with inadequate agency knowledge of the technical aspects of the work and unreasonable reliance on contractors to oversee themselves.
Risk
No function should be contracted out if it poses too great a risk of creating a contractor monopoly or interfering with an agency’s ability to perform its mission. Agencies face two kinds of risk when contracting for a function. First, if an agency relies too heavily on contracting to perform a function, it is possible that a contractor, by virtue of its work for an agency, could develop an exclusive expertise so that the agency cannot perform the function without a particular contractor. Second, the agency is ultimately responsible for performing a function, even if the selected contractor fails. The agency must determine the impact of contractor failure and whether it could interfere with the agency’s mission. Contract oversight is useless if an agency can’t penalize poor performance by removing the contractor without negatively impacting the mission. An agency must be able to reconstitute a function in-house if a selected contractor cannot satisfactorily perform the function.
Transparency and Accountability
No function should be contracted out if contractor performance could cause confusion to the public about whether or not the government is acting. As President Obama stated in a January 21, 2009 memorandum, transparency is important because it promotes accountability and provides information for citizens about what their government is doing. In order to determine what the government is doing, the public must be able to discern when the government is or is not acting.
Decision-making
Agencies must maintain sufficient in-house capability to be thoroughly in control of the policy and management of the agency. In so doing, government officials must be involved in the decision-making process to a greater degree than merely making the final policy decision on the basis of analysis and/or advice by a contractor or contractors. Agency officials must approve the analytical process leading to the decision options and use discretion and make the value judgments throughout the process.
For too long, important functions performed by rank-and-file federal employees have been considered to be commercial because their work is ultimately signed off on by a federal employee manager, even though that federal employee manager spot-checks only a small number of the judgments and recommendations made by rank-and-file federal employees. In other words, the judgments and recommendations of those rank-and-file federal employees are, effectively, determinations that bind their agency. This work is inherently governmental and should never be performed by a contractor.
Development and Maintenance of the Federal Workforce
Human resources must be treated as a critical business function, not just an administrative process. Agencies must place great importance on acquiring, developing, and retaining employees with the knowledge, skills, abilities, and experience needed to meet agencies’ missions.
Before contracting with the private sector to perform any function, agencies must determine whether the work involved is a necessary part of internal workforce development. For example, some functions may seem to be commercial in the abstract but provide necessary experience for employee career progression to inherently governmental functions. Similarly, some functions that may seem to be commercial must be performed by military personnel for purposes of career progression or combat rotation.
A major reason cited by agency officials for turning to contractors is a lack of authority to hire additional federal employees. Personnel ceilings must be removed in order to develop and maintain an adequate federal workforce.
Personal services contracts are generally prohibited because they harm the development and maintenance of the federal workforce. There must be a clear understanding that the government does not contract out jobs but rather functions – functions that can be measured and for which the government can assess the quality of the work performed by a contractor. The contracting out of individual jobs leads to contractors working side-by-side with federal employees, so that the work product cannot be differentiated. The prohibition on personal services contracts should be retained and enforced.
In his final appearance as GAO Chief before Congress in 2008, David Walker suggested that any redefinition of inherently governmental should, as a general rule, consider recurring governmental needs as inherently governmental. Thus, any government function that must be performed for long or indefinite periods of time should be considered inherently governmental and performed by federal employees. Contracts should require a finite or deliverable product which is different from the normal, routine work products of the agency.
Contractor Oversight
Agencies must ensure that they have the ability to oversee contracts, including the ability to:
- specify the work assignments, products, tasks, and responsibilities of the contractor;
- monitor the work of the contractor; and
- evaluate the work of the contractor.
Agencies must maintain an in-house workforce in every function in case of contractor failure and to provide a useful benchmark for determining whether contracted services are being provided at a reasonable cost and level of quality.
Integration with Inherently Governmental Functions
Some functions, while perhaps considered to be commercial in the abstract, are so integrated with inherently governmental functions that they cannot be separated. If poor performance by a contractor would interfere with the agency’s mission, then these functions should not be performed by contractors.
Specific Training/Experience/Expertise Needed
Many functions needed by the government require unique training, experience and/or expertise that can only be acquired by performing the function. Even if retired or former federal employees might be currently available to perform the function as contractor employees, these functions should not be contracted out, because the government would cease to develop employees with the experience/expertise needed to perform the function in the future.
Particular Circumstances
No function should be contracted out until the agency examines the particular circumstances in which the function is performed and whether segregating that function will negatively impact agency flexibility and efficiency. In many situations, agencies utilize federal employees to perform more than one function. For example, at the United States Military Academy at West Point, the employees who perform custodial work are often used to assist in performing public works functions when the custodial workload allows. Segregating the custodial workforce from the public works workforce would negatively impact agency flexibility and efficiency.
Recommendations
In order to encourage agencies to re-establish the boundary between functions that are commercial and functions that are or closely associated with inherently governmental functions, AFGE recommends the following:
- Stop compiling directories of inherently governmental jobs. AFGE urges the Obama Administration to cancel the direction provided to agencies in the revised OMB Circular A-76 to publish inventories of inherently governmental jobs. The FAIR Act deliberately did not include such a requirement.
- Do commercial inventories over – but without OMB pressures. Agencies should be directed to refile their most recent FAIR Act inventories without fear or favor from OMB. Absent OMB pressure, it is likely that a significant number of jobs will be reclassified from commercial. OMB’s role should be restricted to reviewing the lists to ensure some degree of uniformity. However, the composition of the inventories should be exclusively determined by agency officials.
- Use inventories to find in-house staffing shortages. Explicitly involving their staffing and manpower personnel, agencies should be directed to review their most recent in-house inventories in order to determine whether they possess sufficient numbers of qualified federal employees to perform their agencies’ missions. Where insufficient, the agencies should be required to develop plans to increase staffing. Moreover, the A-76 process should not be used where agencies have been determined to be understaffed.
Functions in need of Particular Attention
Below we mention some specific functions that are currently performed by contractors or have been deemed appropriate for contractor performance under the FAIR Act Inventory or A-76 public-private competition process that we find particularly troubling. This list is by no means exhaustive and is meant to highlight a few of the more egregious situations that have been brought to our attention by federal employees. We find that these functions are inherently governmental or closely associated with inherently governmental functions and should only be performed by government personnel.
- Information
- All activities involved in responding to FOIA and Privacy Act requests, including records maintenance
- Management and security of classified material
- Information technology governance
- Access to individuals’ private information
- Communication
- Representing an agency before the public, including preparing or presenting testimony; participating in hearings; preparing executive-level correspondence; attending conferences on behalf of the agency; conducting community relations; responding to questions or requests for information or services (e.g., call centers); communication with foreign governments; communication with state or local governments; waste, fraud, and abuse hotline operators; public affairs; park rangers; and museum operations
- Representing an agency before any other governmental entity, including drafting or sending inter-agency communication
- Representing an agency before Congress, including congressional affairs, preparing or presenting testimony before Congress; and preparing or presenting required reports
- Rules and Regulations
- Drafting regulations, policies, or other rules
- Interpreting or enforcing laws, regulations, policies, or other rules
- Providing legal advice to government officials
- Rights, Privileges, Payments, Collections, and Entitlements
- Federal licensing and permitting
- Determining eligibility to participate in any entitlement or benefit program
- Immigration officers and investigate assistants
- The collection, control, and disbursement of fees, royalties, duties, fines, taxes and other public funds
- Physical Security
- Physical security of military installations and other federal buildings
- Firefighters and police officers
- Operation and maintenance of locks and dams on navigable waterways
- Prisoner detention, guarding, and transport
- Financial Management
- Financial management, including budget preparation and drafting, internal auditing, and asset management and disposal
- Determining budget policy, guidance, and strategy
- Procurement
- Acquisition planning and related support activities
- Contract oversight and administration, including market research, developing statements of work, developing solicitations, technical evaluation of contract proposals; managing contractors; quality assurance; evaluation of contractor performance, and investigations of waste, fraud, and abuse
- Any situation that could allow a contractor to access confidential business information, information on individuals, and/or any other sensitive information
- Military
- 50% of depot-level maintenance and repair
- Core logistics capability necessary to ensure a timely and effective military response to mobilizations
- Management
- Program management and support
- Services that involve or relate to reorganization and planning activities
- Conduct of public-private competitions
- Classifying functions as inherently governmental or commercial (including preparation of a FAIR Act inventory), and determining which functions or portions of functions are suitable for possible private sector performance
- Determining federal program priorities or budget requests
- Personnel
- All functions related to all aspects of human resources, including hiring, labor management relations, and reductions-in-force
- Creation of position descriptions and/or performance standards for federal employees
- Representing an agency before government personnel, including labor relations and supervision
- Any situation where the function performer might be assumed to be a government official
- Agency EEO and health and safety compliance
- Background investigations and security clearances for federal employees and contractor employees
[Area 4(c) What criteria should agencies use in deciding whether a government activity should be competed?]
AFGE urges the Obama administration to enforce the prohibitions against giving work last performed by federal employees to contractors without first conducting a full and fair public-private competition.
Despite the extensive use of the A-76 privatization process and the resulting proof of the superiority of in-house workforces, much work is contracted out without any public-private competition, i.e., without any proof that giving work to contractors is better for taxpayers or better serves those Americans who depend on the federal government for important work.
Federal employees represented by AFGE have experienced several direct conversions in recent years. In some of these situations, contracts have been awarded by an agency during a “surge” with the understanding that they would be short-term. But over time the contracts have expanded, with agencies bringing in contract employees to work side by side with government workers, without even an attempt at a public-private competition to determine if the contracting is more efficient for the agency and for taxpayers.
Congress, on a bipartisan basis, has, repeatedly, prohibited agencies from perpetrating such conversions. For example:
- Since FY04, the Defense Appropriations Bill has prevented any function performed by more than ten federal employees in DoD from being contracted out without public-private competition.
- Since the FY06 predecessor of the Financial Services Appropriations Bill, all non-DoD agencies have been required to operate under the same prohibition.
- Since the FY06 Defense Authorization Bill, no functions performed by ten or more federal employees in the Department of Defense can be contracted out without public-private competition.
- Since the FY08 Defense Authorization Bill, all non-DoD agencies have been required to operate under the same prohibition.
- Since the FY08 Military Construction-Veterans Affairs Appropriations Bill, the Department of Veterans Affairs has been specifically prohibited from contracting out without public-private competition any work performed by more than ten employees in its department.
- Since the FY09 Financial Services Appropriations Bill, all non-DoD agencies are prohibited from contracting out without public-private competitions functions performed by fewer than ten federal employees.
Even Bush Administration OMB officials opposed direct conversions, at least rhetorically. The A-76 Circular, as revised in May 2003, requires agencies to conduct a public-private competition before converting any work last performed by federal employees to contractor performance. Unfortunately, Bush Administration OMB officials chose to be very selective when enforcing the prohibitions in the A-76 circular and in the laws against direct conversions.
During the 2008 campaign, President Obama pledged to correct this problem. For example, in an October 20, 2008, letter to AFGE National President John Gage, then Senator Obama committed to cleaning up waste and mismanagement at the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), singling out “an enormous $1.2 billion sole source contract for human resources without regard to the rules that require them to allow current TSA employees to compete for that work”.
In another letter to AFGE’s Gage, sent on the same date, then Senator Obama was “deeply troubled to learn of the VA’s initial plans to contract out work (required of the department as a result of enactment of an expansion of G.I. bill benefits), using a closed bidding process that lacked an opportunity for current VA employees to compete to keep their jobs, despite their excellent track record and the large numbers of veterans in those jobs. I am glad that VA reversed itself and decided to administer the program in-house.”
AFGE urges the Obama Administration to ensure that all agencies, particularly VA and DoD, comply with all competition requirements established in law and the A-76 circular.
[Area 4(b) What types of criteria might help agencies identify non-inherently governmental functions that are critical to an agency, with respect to its unique missions and structure, and need to be performed by federal employees in order for the agency to maintain control of its mission and operations?]
AFGE is pleased that Congress and the Obama administration have approved and implemented laws to encourage federal agencies to bring contracted work back into government. We believe that the public interest is best served when functions that are inherently governmental, closely related to inherently governmental functions, or mission-essential are performed by government employees within a defined chain of command and subject to vigorous oversight. To properly insource federal jobs, AFGE recommends that the Obama administration continue the practice, first established in the Intelligence Community, of creating a reliable and systematic inventory of federal tasks and reviewing it regularly. Insourcing simply cannot occur without a true inventory of jobs being performed in federal agencies by federal employees and contractors. The government must provide federal employees with full and fair opportunities to compete for new work as well as outsourced work.
As mentioned earlier, the Department of the Army has taken the lead in establishing a service contractor inventory and selecting important functions to insource.
Here are some of the steps that have been taken to adopt insourcing policies:
- In the FY08 Defense Authorization Bill, DoD was required to ensure that consideration is given, on a regular basis, for using federal employees to perform new work and functions that are performed by contractors that could be performed by federal employees. Particular emphasis was placed on insourcing three types of contracts: inherently governmental work wrongly contracted out, work contracted out without competition, and work contracted out that is being poorly performed. The use of the A-76 circular was not required for insourcing the three types of contracts discussed above. Another provision established a requirement for DoD to develop a comprehensive inventory of its service contracts. The Army quickly complied with both requirements and reports that it has insourced almost 1,400 inherently governmental jobs, saving taxpayers $300 million.
- The FY09 Omnibus Appropriations Bill requires non-DoD agencies that are subject to the FAIR Act to develop and implement policies and procedures for insourcing new and outsourced work. In a mid-December 2008 letter organized by AFGE, a dozen federal and non-federal AFL-CIO affiliates also urged retention of this provision.
The following are AFGE recommendations in this area:
- Analysis of contracted work. The Obama Administration should direct agencies to have their contractor workforces examined by independent third parties to determine the extent to which functions that are inherently governmental, closely related to inherently governmental, or mission-essential, are actually performed by contractors. Schedules should be established for incrementally returning those wrongly contracted out functions back in-house.
- Government must develop contractor inventories and insource critical functions. AFGE urges the Obama Administration to require agencies to develop contractor inventories so that agencies can identify each of their service contracts, using the methodology developed by the Department of the Army, and then direct agencies to establish schedules for insourcing functions that are inherently governmental, closely related to inherently governmental, and mission-essential, along the lines required for all agencies.
- Every agency subject to the FAIR Act should be required to develop an inventory to track the cost, quality, and manpower of its service contracts, along the lines already laid down by the Department of the Army. Such contractor inventories should be published and made available to the public. Agency officials should be directed to review their contractor inventories for contracts for functions that are inherently governmental, closely related to inherently governmental, or mission-essential, and develop schedules for bringing this work in-house. Agency officials should be directed to review their contractor inventories for contracts that are being poorly performed or which were awarded without competition and determine which ones are most suitable for insourcing.
- Agencies should be required to provide OMB with periodic reports that discuss savings and improvements generated through insourcing of contracts. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) should be directed to provide agencies with explicit guidance that details the availability and flexibility of hiring authorities in the insourcing context. OPM should be further directed to help agencies develop policies that expedite insourcing efforts.
- Agencies should be freed from in-house headcounts and civil service personnel ceilings and allowed to use funding to hire new employees to perform a service in-house as surely as they can already contract out for its performance. OMB should direct agencies to use their contractor inventories to discretely program and budget for contract services work.
CONCLUSION
AFGE is ready to assist the Obama administration and OMB in establishing a new framework for improving the federal acquisition system and managing – and nurturing - the federal workforce. The first step towards meaningful reform should be passage and enactment of The CLEAN UP (Correction of Longstanding Errors in Agencies Unsustainable Procurements) Act (S. 924, H.R. 2736), legislation introduced recently by Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-MD) and Representative John Sarbanes (D-MD). As AFGE National President John Gage declared, “The CLEAN UP Act is vital to any serious effort to save taxpayer dollars and restore integrity to the federal sourcing process. All Americans who depend on the federal government for important services have a compelling interest in making sure this important legislation becomes law.”
The CLEAN UP Act would:
- establish overarching principles to govern sourcing, which would ensure that inherently governmental, closely associated with inherently governmental, and mission-essential functions are performed by reliable and experienced federal employees, while allowing other functions to shift between federal employees and contractors, depending on which is more efficient and effective, consistent with agency needs and any competition requirements;
- encourage agencies to insource new functions in order to avoid sole-source and limited competition contracts;
- ensure that agencies incrementally insourcing inherently governmental, closely associated with inherently governmental, and mission-essential functions that have been wrongly contracted out;
- require that all agencies establish inventories of their service contracts, in part, so that contracts that are poorly performing or are appropriate for insourcing can be quickly identified;
- ensure that agencies identify where they are now or will later experience shortages of federal employees;
- establish internal business process reengineering as an alternative to the costly and controversial OMB Circular A-76 privatization process;
- recommend that critically needed reforms to the A-76 process finally be undertaken; and
- suspend all use of the A-76 process until the reforms required by The CLEAN UP Act have been substantially implemented.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this important matter.